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Panel I: Database Protection 
Moderator:     Hugh Hansen* 
Panelists:        Robert Eisenbach** 
                       Lisa Ferri*** 
                       Robert Gibbons**** 
                       Charles Sims***** 
                       John Cotter****** 
 
MR. PENNISI:  This is our first panel discussion, concerning the 
implications of database mining and whether collections of 
information should be afforded statutory protection.  The discussion 
will be preceded by five minutes of remarks by each panelist and 
followed by general discussion among the panel and questions from 
the audience. 
Our database panelists are: 
Bob Eisenbach III, who is a partner in the Creditors Rights and 
Bankruptcy and Internet practice group of Cooley Godward and is a 
member of the firms Litigation Department.  He joined the firm in 
1986 and works in the San Francisco Office.  Mr. Eisenbachs 
practice is concentrated in the areas of creditors rights, bankruptcy, 
and Internet and commercial litigation.  Mr. Eisenbach represents 
clients in a wide variety of commercial litigation cases, including 
Internet-related litigation, copyright infringement, trademark 
infringement, real estate, and other business disputes. 
 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Rutgers University, B.A. 
1968; Georgetown University, J.D. 1972; Yale University School of Law, LL.M. 1977. 
 **  Partner, Cooley Godward LLP.  Louisiana State University, B.A. 1982;  University of 
Virginia, J.D., 1985. 
 ***  Partner, Hopgood, Calimafde, Judlowe & Mondolino LLP.  University of Virginia, 
B.A. 1984;  Seton Hall University, J.D. 1987. 
 ****  Partner, Hopgood, Calimafde, Judlowe & Mondolino LLP.  New York University, 
B.A. 1984; Columbia University, J.D. 1989. 
 *****  Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP.  Amherst College, B.A. 1971;  Yale Law School, J.D. 
1976. 
******  Partner, Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP.  Northwestern University, B.S. 1985;  
Suffolk University Law School, J.D. 1989. 
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Hugh Hansen is a Professor of Law at Fordham University, where 
he has been teaching since 1978.  Professor Hansen primarily 
concentrates on constitutional, copyright, trademark, and 
international and comparative copyright law.  For the past eight 
years, Professor Hansen has hosted an annual conference on the state 
of international intellectual property law and policy at Fordham, and 
he is a frequent source of advice for the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal. 
Lisa Ferri and Rob Gibbons are partners at the intellectual property 
firm of Hopgood, Calimafde, Judlowe & Mondolino, practicing in 
the areas of patents, trademarks, and copyright law.  They provide 
litigation and transactional services to clients in a full range of areas 
impacting the Internet, including e-commerce, entertainment, and 
publishing.  They have recently published articles pertinent to 
todays discussion regarding database collections in the September, 
2000 issue of Intellectual Property Today and the July 20th edition 
of E-commerce Weekly. 
Chuck Sims is a partner in the Litigation and Dispute Resolution 
departments of Proskauer Rose, where he concentrates on copyright 
and First Amendment issues.  In the realm of copyright, Mr. Sims 
has worked on matters for the publishing, motion picture, and music 
industries.  On database issues, he has represented Lexis-Nexis in the 
West cases in the Second Circuit,1 in the Matthew Bender v. Jurisline 
case,2 and in the class actions following the Tasisi decision.3 
And finally, John Cotter is a partner of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault 
in the Patent and Intellectual Property Practice group.  Mr. Cotter 
specializes in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, particularly in the areas of counseling, technology litigation 
 
 1 Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publg Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
copyright protection does not extend to information that is merely rearranged in a manner 
that is lacking even minimal creativity). 
 2 Matthew Bender & Co. v. Jurisline.com, 91 F. Supp. 2d 677 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that 
violations of a shrinkwrap agreement are not copyright violations, but rather breach of 
contract and fraud). 
 3 See Posner v. Gale Group, Inc. No. 00 Civ. 7376 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 28, 2000); 
Authors Guild v. The Dialog Corporation, No. 00 Civ. 6049 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 15, 2000); 
Laney v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 00 Civ. 9411 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 2000). 
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and the licensing of patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  Mr. Cotter 
is presently lead counsel for the auction aggregator Bidders Edge in 
its dispute with eBay.com pending in the Northern District of 
California and the Ninth Circuit.4 
Professor Hugh Hansen will begin. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Thank you, Chris, very much, and 
congratulations on putting together an excellent program.  We have a 
very distinguished panel.  Thank you for inviting me to participate.  
My job is just to moderate and provide a brief introduction.   
The history of database regulation traces back to Fordham.  In 
1991, Jean Francois Verstrynge was at Fordham teaching as a guest 
in our European Community Center.  He was the head of DGIII\E-4, 
which then was the head of copyright in the Commission of the 
European Community, now the European Union.  When Feist v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc.5 came down, I gave him a copy of 
the decision.  He looked at it and said, Uh-oh, weve got to change 
our directive.  At the time, there was a proposed directive which just 
covered copyright, and included no sui generis law.6 
So, interestingly, a U.S. Supreme Court decision probably had 
more effect on European Union law than it has had on U.S. law, at 
least to date, in inspiring a sui generis provision.  It took a long time 
to produce this provision in the European Union  not because 
people were worried about too much protection, but because the 
U.K. people and other database owners thought it was not protective 
enough, that there were too many exceptions.  Five years later it was 
finally passed in 1996.7 
 
 4 eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000), appeal 
docketed, No. 00-15995 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2000) (voluntarily dismissed Mar. 5, 2001). 
 5 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding factual compilations may possess required originality 
to qualify for copyright purposes if choices of selection and arrangements are independently 
made with a minimal degree of creativity). 
 6 See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on 
the Legal Protection of Databases, COM (92) 24 Final- SYN 393, art. 1 (1992).  For a 
discussion on the evolution of the European Database Directive, see J.H. Reichman and 
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997). 
 7 See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (Database Directive). 
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In 1996, the U.S. Government introduced, through Congress, a 
database bill that was largely based upon the EU Database 
Directive.8  Unfortunately for the proponents of that bill, it came 
right at the time of the Diplomatic Conference on the WIPO 
copyright treaties.  For those treaties the technical digital industries 
had bulked up  AT&T, MCI, other lobbyists, a lot of money  in 
anticipation of the consideration process of the treaties in Geneva, 
and as a by-product were prepared for the U.S. database bill and 
were able to kill it.  It came back in the next Congress, much revised, 
as a misappropriation bill of the type that we have now in H.R. 354.9  
It did not get through that Congress and the current version is 
probably not going to get through this Congress either. 
The Commerce Committee added H.R. 1858, which was 
introduced, I believe, in May of 1999.10  This legislation, which is 
purportedly there to protect databases, really would dramatically 
reduce the protection we have for databases even today, without the 
bill. 
I think there are a number of issues which people might want to 
address.  One of the nice things about the bills being stalled is, today, 
 
 8 The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 104th Cong. 
(1996). 
 9 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) (The Coble Bill).  The Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act creates civil liability for making all or part of an electronic collection of 
information available to the public, where the unauthorized publication causes material 
harm to the database creators markets.  However, the bill protects the making available or 
extraction of information from databases for illustration, explanation, example, comment, 
criticism, teaching, research, or analysis if reasonable under the circumstances.  Similarly, 
making data available for nonprofit educational, scientific, or research uses that does not 
materially harm the primary market for the product or service does not create liability under 
the Act.  H.R. 354 specifically excludes from liability the extraction of an individual item of 
information or other insubstantial part of a collection of information.  Finally, making 
available or extracting information for verification, news reporting, transfer of copies by the 
owners of lawfully made copies, searching genealogical information for nonprofit or 
religious purposes, or private, noncommercial purposes and investigative, protective, or 
intelligence activities are all protected uses of databases.  H.R. 354 also exempts 
government collections of information and pieces of software from consideration as 
collections of information. 
 10 Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858 106th Cong. (1999) 
(The Bliley Bill).  H.R. 1858 would create civil liability for public distribution of any part 
of a database for any reason other than news reporting, law enforcement, scientific or 
educational purposes. 
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nine years after Feist, we can address certain questions.  Do we 
really need a database bill?  Has the database industry been able to 
survive on various theories, including breach of contract or 
shrinkwrap license agreements and trespass?  And finally, would it 
be constitutional to attempt to bypass copyright law and go to some 
sort of misappropriation law under the Commerce Clause?11 
On the other hand, because the European Union has passed its 
directive, we have a laboratory in Europe testing the effects of 
database protection.  The directive, which is much more restrictive 
than the proposed bill from the House Judiciary Committee, was 
passed and adopted in 1996 and the Member States have 
implemented it.12  We can begin to see what effect this European 
database effort has had on the public domain.  So time will answer 
some of the questions that we have been debating all these years. 
These are all interesting issues, and I am sure there are others that 
our panelists want to address.  Without further ado, lets go to the 
panel. Why dont we start out with Mr. Eisenbach? 
MR. EISENBACH:  First of all, I would like to thank the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal and the 
School of Law for inviting me to be a member of this panel and for 
hosting this very timely symposium.  It is a pleasure to be here with 
you. 
This panels topic focuses us on the implications of database 
mining and consideration of whether such databases should be given 
statutory protection. 
The worldwide network that is the Internet enables any computer 
to access data virtually anywhere in the world on any other computer 
or server.13  This permits an individual or business to mine, or even 
wholesale copy, a database built through the energy and investment 
of another far more easily than has ever been possible. 
 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 12 See Database Directive, supra, note 6  . 
 13 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (discussing the nature and genesis of 
the Internet).  
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The mechanism by which database mining takes place I think is 
critically important in understanding the analysis of the issue.  While 
CD-ROMs certainly can be copied and uploaded, in the Internet 
realm, database mining more often involves the use of a software 
program, commonly known as a robot, a spider, or a crawler.  
This software robot accesses the computer system of the database 
owner and crawls and copies data from a system tens  or even 
hundreds of thousands of times a day.14 
In eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc.,15 the district court found that 
Bidders Edge sent requests or crawled the eBay computer system 
between 80,000 and 100,000 times per day before it was enjoined.16  
My law firm, Cooley Godward, and my colleagues, Janet Cullum 
and Gary Ritchey in particular, have led eBays legal team in that 
case, as a point of disclosure. 
Such crawling intermeddles with and uses a computer system, its 
bandwidth, and other resources associated with it.  It can lead to a 
degradation of service for the users of the Web site, or even the 
complete shutdown of the Web site. 
This intermeddling and unauthorized use of anothers computer 
system is a trespass.  Judge Whyte, the district judge in the eBay 
case, held, and I quote, The law recognizes no such right to use 
anothers personal property.17  The protection of such property 
rights is, and has been, fundamental to our economic system.  The 
right to exclude others from using ones property is perhaps the 
quintessential property right, whether it be personal or real property. 
Todays information economy has been built by enterprising 
businesses investing heavily in the development of databases and 
other information and the computer systems that permit them to 
function.  Database miners free-ride off the investment of others 
 
 14 eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(discussing the nature and operation of software robots or spiders). 
 15 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing 
Bidders Edge, an internet-based auction aggregation site, from accessing eBays computer 
system by use of any automated querying program without plaintiffs written authorization). 
 16 Id. at 1071. 
 17 Id. 
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by using their property  their computer systems  without 
permission.  Under the existing law of trespass to chattels  or 
perhaps real property, under the often-used analogy of cyberspace to 
the bricks and mortar world, a database miner simply has no right to 
use anothers property. 
When measures to block access of the Internet protocol addresses 
for the database miner fail, unauthorized use can and should be 
enjoined. 
The trespass cause of action is not preempted under Section 301 of 
the Copyright Act,18 because the gravamen of the trespass claim does 
not involve any of the exclusive rights of Section 106.19  Its focus is 
on the use of, or intermeddling with, personal physical property, not 
the reproduction or distribution of or the making of derivative works 
from copyrighted works.  The extra element present and required to 
avoid preemption is that of unauthorized use of a tangible computer 
system, not the intangible copyright. 
Database mining, however, does implicate the issue of protecting 
the underlying database.  As our economy moves more and more 
towards reliance on information, databases and other collections of 
information take on greater importance.  These databases require 
substantial investments to create, they provide value to the users of 
the databases, and they are worthy of protection. 
 
 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (2000). 
 19  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  The statute reads as follows:  Subject to sections 107 
through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: 
 (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
 (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
 (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
 (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
 (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture 
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
 (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission. 
PANEL I.PP4 3/27/01  6:18 PM 
282 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:275 
 
At the same time, as we know, the Internet and the digital format 
of these databases makes them far easier to copy.  Indeed, entire 
databases can be crawled, copied, and presented by another Web site 
through the use of these software robots in a very short period of 
time.  This is far different from having to manually input data from 
telephone books or other hard-copy data compilations. 
This new ease of copying increases the risk of free-riding.  
Database free-riding exists when third parties enjoy the benefits of 
databases without investing the time, money, and effort in creating 
them.  Without sufficient barriers to free-riding, companies will be 
discouraged from making the investments needed to create these 
databases in the first place. 
Although existing copyright laws provide some protection to 
database compilations, the Supreme Courts Feist20 decision, which 
involved a compilation outside of the Internet context, raises serious 
questions about the scope of those protections. 
As such, new statutory protections for databases should be 
enacted.  H.R. 354, the Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act, 
is an important legislative proposal that would protect collections of 
information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person 
through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources 
from anyone who extracts or makes all or a substantial part of that 
collection available without permission.21 
The Act contains a number of exclusions, including a fair use-type 
exclusion, and one clarifying that anyone may create their own 
database of the same underlying facts as long as they do so through 
the investment of their own time and money, and not someone 
elses.22  Such protections benefit not only the owners of the 
databases, but also the economy as a whole.  Knowing that the 
collections they create will be protected, entrepreneurs will invest in 
their creations.  Our economy has succeeded by protecting property 
rights, rather than allowing others to free-ride.  The same 
 
 20  Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 21 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402 (1999). 
 22 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1403 (1999). 
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fundamental principles that have served us well in protecting 
physical property in the old economy apply equally to protecting 
information property in the new economy. 
MS. FERRI: Good morning. 
I would like to offer a few background thoughts to todays 
discussion.  Unlike the issues that will be discussed here this 
afternoon  namely, protection of digital audio and visual works  
the issue of protection of databases and compilations has been with 
us for hundreds of years. 
Here in the United States, compilations of data have enjoyed some 
form of legal protection since the inception of our statutory copyright 
laws.  The rationale followed by courts for many years was that the 
law should protect the efforts and investment of the compiler  in 
other words, his or her sweat of the brow.23 
With the 1991 decision of the Supreme Court in Feist 
Publications, sweat of the brow was repudiated and originality 
became the touchstone of copyright protection in compilations.24  
The Court found that there could be no copyright in facts themselves, 
only where there is some originality in the arrangement or selection 
of those facts.25  Following Feist, owners of non-creative databases 
were left with little protection. 
With the recent developments in software and digital technology 
and the advent of the Internet, a compilers ability to create important 
databases is greatly enhanced, but so too is a second comers ability 
to copy and disseminate a database cheaply and quickly. 
The Internet has made databases a multi-billion dollar industry, 
and clearly databases form an integral part of the e-commerce boom 
we are all witnessing.  For these economic reasons, the protection of 
databases has become so pressing. 
 
 
 23  See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's 
Circular Publg Co. v. Keystone Publg Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922). 
 24  See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.  
 25  See id.  
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Recently we have seen a spate of cases involving databases which 
illustrate the ongoing dispute between protection of property and the 
interests of public access.  Ticketmaster, My Simon, Monster.com, 
and eBay have all sued  or threatened suit  to stop other sites 
from searching their databases on the Web and linking to their 
sites.26  Clearly, the technologies of the Internet have caught us off 
guard and without clear legal solutions. 
Therefore, data providers have sought to protect their assets 
through a patchwork of measures, none clearly foolproof.  For 
instance, data providers have looked to technology as a first line of 
defense and have tried, encryption, password protection, digital 
signatures, or restricting by code those who can use a file or enter a 
site. 
But technology alone is not the answer, as it continually changes.  
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc. for example, 
Ticketmasters ability to block Tickets.coms hyperlink to its interior 
pages was gained and lost while the case was pending. 27 
Another avenue of protection which has gained popularity is 
contract in the form of shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreements.  A 
shrinkwrap agreement was used successfully against Jurisline.com 
in defeating a preemption claim in the recent New York case 
involving copying and dissemination of the Lexis database.28  In 
contrast to that case and the ProCD decision,29 however, other courts 
have found state actions based on shrinkwrap agreements preempted 
by the Copyright Act.  A data compiler, therefore, may be 
unprotected, depending on the court he or she ends up in. 
Trespass is the latest creative tactic used by compilers.  It turned 
up both in Ticketmaster and eBay v. Bidders Edge, with different 
 
 26 See, e.g.,  Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1344 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (injunction denied); 
eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (motion to deny 
counterclaims denied). 
 27 See Ticketmaster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1344. 
 28 See Matthew Bender & Co. v. Jurisline.com, 91 F. Supp. 2d 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 29 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)  (holding that shrinkwrap licenses 
are treated as a contract between private parties and thus unaffected by the preemption 
clause of Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act). 
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results.30  We will have to wait through the appeal process to see if 
trespass offers new ammunition to data compilers. 
But there is already criticism that the decision may have a far-
reaching and detrimental effect on how people access and use 
information on the Internet.  Both sides of this debate are also 
looking to Congress to enact legislation that will balance the needs of 
database owners with the publics need for open and free access to 
information.  The solution is still far off, as there is not full 
agreement as to whether the issue should be determined by the 
courts, the legislature, or the industry itself. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Thank you very much. 
Robert Gibbons? 
MR. GIBBONS:  Good morning.  I would also like to thank Chris 
Pennisi and the hosts of todays Symposium for inviting us to attend.  
It is a privilege and an honor to be here today. 
When Jesse Feder spoke earlier today, he alluded to the Brave 
New World of the Internet, and I think it is sometimes helpful for us 
to realize the magnitude of what we are dealing with here, and 
sometimes it is helpful when you are trying to figure out where you 
are going to look back to where you have been. 
It was thirty years ago that Alvin Toffler wrote his runaway best-
seller book Future Shock, and in it he observed the impact of the 
computer.31  This book was written in 1970.  Toffler commented on 
the impact of the computer: With its unprecedented power for 
analysis and dissemination of extremely varied kinds of data in 
unbelievable quantities and at a mind-staggering speed, it has 
become a major force behind the latest acceleration in knowledge 
acquisition.32  That was thirty years ago.  That statement holds true 
exponentially with respect to the Internet and the world of online 
communication. 
 
 30 See Ticketmaster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1344 (finding state trespass claims 
preempted by the Copyright Act); cf. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1066-67 (finding eBay had a 
likelihood of success on the merits of state trespass claims). 
 31 Alvin Toffler, FUTURE SHOCK (1970). 
 32  Id. at 28-29. 
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What we have to wrestle with is, how do we protect property rights 
 and should there be property rights  in databases?  In order to 
do that, we have to recognize that there is an ongoing tension of 
interests between those who compile databases, who want to assert a 
property right, and those who want to use them at minimal to no cost, 
even for competitive purposes. 
In assessing whether or not there should be protection, we are 
going to need ground rules, and we need to negotiate those ground 
rules.  That is probably going to be an ongoing process not disposed 
of with any one legislative effort or tweaking of common law or 
copyrights.  It is a challenge that we all must undertake. 
I think it is useful to look at Clause 8, the Copyright and Patent 
Clause of the Constitution, which states that Congress has the power 
to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.33 
A database is a work within the subject of copyright because it is 
a compilation, as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 103.34  The entire work 
comes within the statute, even though its discrete content may not. 
But the Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled on this issue in 
two decisions.  In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.35 
the Court struck down a Florida statute giving patent-like protection 
to unpatented direct-molding processes for making boat hulls.  In 
Feist,36 the Court struck down an attempt by the plaintiff to use its 
 
 33 U.S. CONST. Art. I., § 8, cl. 8. 
 34 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). The statute reads as follows: 
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and 
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which 
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been 
used unlawfully. 
 (b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material 
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material 
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. 
The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, 
duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material. 
Id. 
 35 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 36 Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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copyright in combined white and yellow page directories to prohibit 
the defendant from making a compilation using the alphabetically-
arranged names, addresses, and phone numbers from its white pages.  
In so ruling, as William Patry of Cardozo University has observed, 
the Court unequivocally stated that originality is the standard by 
which we decide whether something is copyrighted and, hence, 
protected, or whether or not it is a publicly-available material 
because it lacks the requisite originality.37 
I think what we have to recognize is that originality, as the 
Supreme Court has defined it, is the touchstone.  We have to keep 
that in mind when we say, Well, people have worked hard to 
compile these databases, and advocate legislative action.  The risk 
of these various legislative proposals is over-protection because they 
sweep in facts and non-original data with thin copyright protection 
for the selection and arrangement elements that may arguably be 
original.  So, there is a danger with the sui generis proposals, such as 
the Coble Bill38  and the Bliley Bill39 even, which is far more 
narrow  to lock up the building blocks of facts and ideas that we 
need to promote knowledge, to promote science, and do an end-run 
around Feist and the Constitution in the process. 
It is appropriate here to read a very pertinent portion of Feist, 
which states that: Raw facts may be copied at will.  This result is 
neither unfair nor unfortunate.  It is the means by which copyright 
advances the progress of science.  That is Justice OConnor writing 
in Feist.40 
She also wrote in Bonito Boats: For almost one hundred years, it 
has been well-established that in the case of an expired patent, the 
federal patent laws do create a federal right to copy and use.41 
 
 37 See William E. Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: 
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH L. REV. 359, 360-61 (1999). 
 38 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act of 1999, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 
1999). 
 39 Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1999). 
 40 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349. 
 41 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that the public has a right, 
under Clause 8, the Patent and Copyright Clause, to copy, to reap 
where it has not sown, if the harvest is of unoriginal material.  I think 
we have to keep that in mind. 
While I am not saying that we do not need to continue to look at 
legislative endeavors and try to strike a proper balance between the 
competing interests of the database compiler and those who wish to 
use it, we have to do so without throwing out our jurisprudence, 
because the proper balance is originality. That is what the 
Constitution provides; that is what the Supreme Court has ruled.  We 
should only give recognition to original elements of a database.  
Whether that is through careful encryption techniques or what have 
you, we should not lock up basic facts and information that we all 
need to do our work, to make other works, and add to the 
environment. 
In closing, I would just like to throw out a couple of considerations 
that I found interesting in preparing for today, some things that we 
ought to consider in connection with evaluating the Coble Bill, the 
Bliley Bill, and the European Directive. 
A lot of these rationales replace originality as the vanguard 
between original and unoriginal material  and, hence, private 
rights versus public rights  with a very wishy-washy standard, 
which is substantial investment.  Now, isnt this just a reinvention 
of the sweat of the brow doctrine?  I think, in part, that it is. 
One of the things we should look at is whether the rationales for 
statutory protection assume that only one database author exists from 
which consumers want to buy or access.  They tend to ignore the 
costs of giving a monopoly to the first subscriber, the impact of that 
cost on subsequent authors and on the public.  When you lock up the 
facts and charge a high rate for access, you are limiting the ability to 
create new works. 
Also, I think these measures fail to account for the empirical 
evidence out there, which is that since Feist was decided in 1991, the 
number of databases, and the complexity of those databases, has 
grown, despite the very thin copyright protection available to those 
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databases.  I will just give you a couple of statistics. 
According to Martha Williams, between 1991 and 1997, the 
number of databases increased by 35 percent, from 7,637 databases 
to 10,338, and the number of files in these new databases has 
increased from 4 billion to 11.2 billion, a 180 percent increase.42 
These sui generis proposals ignore the availability of less 
sweeping measures, such as contract, shrinkwrap licenses, clickwrap 
licenses, and security and access control systems.  They also negate 
the market realities that other users have.  Each user has a lead-time 
advantage, although it may be increasingly small in the online world.  
They also have name recognition ability, so if you have a good name 
and a good reputation and you provide good service, you should be 
able to survive in the marketplace.  You have advertising  Madison 
Avenue, thank you  and you also have value-added features, where 
you can enhance the product services that you offer and distinguish 
yourself from the competition. 
We have many potential remedies and factors to weigh in 
evaluating whether we have to gap fill where the Supreme Court 
left off.  Perhaps we do not need to do so in such a sweeping fashion 
as proposed by the Coble Bill. 
Thank you. 
MR. SIMS: The fundamental error, I think, in the previous 
remarks are a focus on protection of information along property 
lines, rather than, at least as the Judiciary Committee is moving 
toward, creating a cause of action for misappropriation. 
I think Robert Eisenbach got it exactly right when he said the 
fundamental principle of justice which animates all of this search for 
protection is the ancient rule against free-riding, the notion that is 
endemic in many parts of our law and underlies many parts of it: that 
it is just wrong to reap where you have not sown.  The theft of my 
house is a bad thing, as far as I am concerned, whether or not the 
house is original. 
 
 42 Martha E. Williams, The State of Databases Today: 1998, in GALE DIRECTORY OF 
DATABASES at xviii (Erin E. Holmerberg ed., Sept. 1997). 
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Standard & Poors (S&P) spends millions of dollars collecting 
real-time data, manipulating it, massaging it, recalculating it, 
presenting it.  They sell it for very large amounts of money to 
brokerage houses and financial houses.  Control over its 
dissemination is protected only by contract between S&P and its 
clients.  Merrill Lynch and First Boston and others have agreed to 
pay thousands and thousands of dollars for that information because 
it is of great value to them.  S&P thus has a strong incentive to 
control its dissemination.  However, there is no legal recourse for 
interception of a data transfer. Why should somebody else be able to 
obtain that information for free merely because it consists of facts? 
What underlies the Coble Bill is the recognition that there is a 
difference  an important one, and one that certainly avoids any 
constitutional problems  between the use of facts  individual or 
scattered facts  and wholesale piracy of an entire database.  It is 
wholesale piracy, which digital technology has made so incredibly 
easy, which necessitates statutory protection of databases. 
Now, I think to some extent misappropriation law, which is state 
law, would have been adequate had the courts applied the 
preemption doctrine in the way in which I think Congress meant it to 
be applied.  But, as the Second Circuits decision in the NBA case 
shows, the misappropriation doctrine has not fared well under 
preemption, and the courts have really given it a miserably narrow 
scope.43  Longstanding misappropriation law prohibited wholesale 
information piracy until it was held in various circumstances to have 
been preempted.44  And so, what we have is the spectacle of what 
Robert Eisenbach and his colleagues were reduced to in the eBay 
case: in every given case where you find wholesale piracy you have 
to tiptoe around preemption, dig out these old common law doctrines 
on misappropriation, pray that you get a judge who looks at the right 
line of preemption cases, and hope that the court will adopt your 
view that database protection is really not like copyright. 
I think that eBay was marvelously successful in pitching its 
trespass theory, and I think if you look at some of the cases which 
 
 43 See Ortiz Valle v. NBA, 190 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 44 See generally, 17 U.S.C. § 301; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141. 
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have held various common law causes of action are preempted, that 
same approach could have been used against them.  I do not know 
the degree of confidence you all had. 
I know in the case we had for Lexis-Nexis against Jurisline.com,45 
a huge amount of our time in litigating the case, organizing and 
strategizing, was devoted to the problem of surmounting a really 
niggardly approach to misappropriation in case law.  We prevailed in 
the case because there was contract barring retransmission of Lexis 
data that the individuals who ran Jurisline had signed and then faxed 
back, luckily, six separate times with initials, so that we were able to 
rely on a contract claim. 
The same professors who are vigorously opposed to sui generis 
protection  protection like the Coble Bill  are also opposed to 
enforcement of contracts in connection with these kinds of claims.  
There is an enormous cottage industry in anti-protection analysis 
which urges that contracts ought not to protect against wholesale 
piracy and that misappropriation ought not to protect against it; no 
other causes of action ought to protect against piracy, because the 
more people that can use these databases, the better it is for society.  
That is really, I think, a Napster approach to the Internet, which is, 
Gee, isnt this all wonderful? 
Well, it is not wonderful if, over time, the ease of theft and the 
resistance of the courts to prohibit theft and enforce remedies against 
theft, deter the creation and supply of databases that are useful for all 
of us.  It is that policy underlying copyright law  namely, that if we 
have protection against some kinds of misuse, we will have more 
content creation or more investment in databases by Standard & 
Poors, by Lexis, by other people  that makes for progress in the 
sciences and useful arts and ultimately, for a better society. 
MR. COTTER:  Thank you, Professor Hansen, and thank you to 
the Journal for inviting me and the rest of the panelists.  I feel very 
lucky to be here to learn from you and from the panelists. 
 
 
 45 See Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. Jurisline.com, 91 F. Supp. 2d 677 (S.D.N.Y.  
2000). 
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I think back to about six years ago to when I saw Professor Hansen 
speak about sui generis protection for databases and thought, Im 
never going to have any involvement with that.  Here I am, six 
years later, and I guess it is his fault. 
I represent Bidders Edge in the eBay suit.46  These views are 
mine, not those of Bidders Edge or anyone else, and I do not want to 
turn my side of it into a position paper on what is right or wrong, but 
just a couple of things about database protection in general. 
First of all, I am very concerned with the term database 
protection that we throw around.  What is a database?  Who is being 
protected?  And, what are they being protected from?  Those are the 
issues we are all trying to wrestle with. 
I hear lots of discussion, not just here but in other places, about 
wholesale copying, about free-riding, and I think it is important to 
think about what exactly is going on.  Not all accused free-riders and 
accused wholesale copiers are doing the same thing.  They do not all 
have the same degree of culpability, if any at all.  It is very important 
to think about those things when somebody is drafting legislation 
that we are going to have to live with. 
It may be that there is what is truly wholesale copying and direct 
use of that copied material in competition with the person from 
whom it may have been copied, and then there are circumstances 
where information is used for other purposes, and used to facilitate 
information used by consumers.  Not that everything has to be free, 
not that I am in favor of a wide-open Internet, or wide-open 
databases.  But, users have some rights to get some information, and 
we have to make a determination of how much information they are 
going to be precluded from getting by some broad law drafted in the 
name of piracy, free-riding, and wholesale copying.  We can talk 
about that in greater detail,  but first, I have one other major question, 
and it goes to the sui generis issue: Why do we need more 
intellectual property?  Who is being harmed here?  I think Rob was 
getting to some of that. 
 
 46 See eBay Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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You can analyze it economically.  Who is being harmed?  What is 
going on?  Is it a situation in which someone is taking, wholesale, the 
data of another and going into direct competition with that data 
against the person from whom the information was taken?  Or, is it a 
situation where the person is taking some limited amount of the data, 
processing it in a new way, and providing that to consumers so 
consumers can make wise choices, and where the person who is 
processing the data and providing it to consumers is not taking 
anything economic from the person from whom the information was 
originally taken? 
And the last thing that goes to that issue is: whether consumers are 
being heard here  again, not in the sense of being able to get 
anything they want at any time for free, but whether consumers are 
being heard here, or is it just a matter of large publishers trying to get 
yet another law that they can use to hammer more people who are 
trying to facilitate giving information to consumers so consumers can 
make decisions, make purchases? 
Thanks. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  We will now open this up to discussion.  
To put some order in it, I think we will do it by issue and invite the 
audience  a very distinguished audience, I might say also  to 
participate either by making comments or by asking questions. 
The first issue for discussion was raised by Rob on constitutional 
issues.  Is unconstitutional for Congress to enact statutory database 
protection?  In short, if Congress passed one of these bills, would the 
Supreme Court, under the Feist opinion, find it an unconstitutional 
exercise of power by Congress not authorized under Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8, and that the Commerce Clause could not be an 
alternative method of doing that? 
PARTICIPANT [Jesse Feder, Policy Planning Advisor, U.S. 
Copyright Office]:  I think you have just raised an important issue 
that was slightly overlooked.  It is not merely a question of whether 
this can be enacted under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the 
Constitution, but whether the Supreme Courts interpretation of that 
Clause of the Constitution somehow prevents Congress from 
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enacting it under another power, because this legislation is expressly 
premised not on the Copyright and Patent Clause, but on the 
Commerce Clause.  Similarly, I would mention the Vessel Hull 
Design Protection Act47 which provides at the federal level the kind 
of protection that the Supreme Court had overturned at the state level 
under the Supremacy Clause in Bonito Boats.48 
PARTICIPANT:  My name is Yochai Benkler.  I am a Professor at 
NYU Law. 
I think it is correct to say that the question is whether the Act can 
be enacted under the Commerce Clause.  I think when one reads 
slightly over a hundred years of precedent  from the trademark 
cases, to the Sears-Compco line, 49 through to Bonito Boats, and from 
Graham v. John Deere of Kansas City50 to Feist  the answer is that 
if any law that Congress passes substantively provides an intellectual 
property right in a way that does not comply with the substantive 
limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause51  i.e., originality, 
one realizes that Congress cannot legislate this way under any power, 
because.  Why?  Because, unlike most clauses of Article I, Section 8, 
the Patent and Copyright Clause, enacts substantive limitations on 
Congresss power. 
And, as long as we are talking about substantive limitations of 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, and a law that is substantively the law 
of the kind Congress is empowered to enact under the Clause, 
Congress cannot create that power except within those limitations, 
which means H.R. 35452 will be unconstitutional. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Okay. 
I see heads shaking on the panel, and we will have some further 
discussion from the panel.  But before we hit the panel, who have all 
 
 47 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998)  
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 511, adding § 512). 
 48 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141. 
 49 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 50 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 52 H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). 
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spoken, is there anyone else in the audience who would like to 
address these issues? 
PARTICIPANT:  Wouldnt perhaps such legislation be a good 
way of reconsidering Feist  in other words, prompting the U.S. 
Supreme Court to reconsider whether or not perhaps a middle ground 
can be found?  Under U.K. law, skill and labor, not substantive 
investment and not creativity, is essential for copyright.53 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  I think everyone is giving way too much 
importance to Feist.  Feist was a unanimous Supreme Court opinion, 
which usually means a lot in constitutional law.  In intellectual 
property law, it means half of the justices were asleep and didnt care 
about the case.  If you look at the unanimous decisions, most of them 
are not followed later on.  For instance, the broad import of Sears 
and Compco was never followed by any lower court.  The Sixth 
Circuit said both opinions were completely dicta, and the Supreme 
Court certainly has not followed it.  Bonito Boats is really not Sears 
and Compco; it is a watered-down version at best, and of course the 
case concerned preemption of state action and not the extent of 
federal power. 
Also, some on the Court are on a global kick, meeting here and in 
Europe with judges on the European Court of Justice.  Thus, they 
might be more attuned to the effect that our laws have on Europe and 
vice versa.  Some might already know that if the U.S. does not find 
some way to find protection, our companies are not going to get 
protected under the EU Directive. 
Second, the Court has never been tremendously doctrinal.  In my 
view, its decisions have been largely policy-based.  It is difficult to 
find any situation where Congress really wanted to do something that 
could not be done effectively by the state and the Court said you 
cannot do it at all.  This certainly has not happened past the New 
Deal.  And ironically, the people who are against the database bill are 
normally for broad Commerce Clause power. 
 
 53 See Peter Stone, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY (1990). 
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And you always have McCulloch v. Maryland,54 and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.55  If anyone takes Justice Marshalls broad 
definition of Congress power seriously, then Congress has the 
power to do basically anything, even if the specific language of the 
Constitution does not say so.  At least, that is the theoretical 
argument. 
In my view, Feist was not a serious case because there was no real 
sweat of the brow and no free-riding.  Whereas in the old days 
creating a white pages phone directory required a lot of people 
with file cards to hand assemble and check individual phone listings, 
today phone information is digital and a directory can be created 
quickly without much human input.  So, there was no sweat of the 
brow, no human effort, in Feist. 
And there was no free-riding; this company paid for the 
information it wanted from seven out of the eight directories  and 
offered to pay the plaintiff who refused the offer.  Moreover, Feist 
created a productive work, something that was different from other 
directories.  So it was not just a same-use type of free-riding. 
I think it is a good argument and a good point that John Cotter 
raised, that there are different shades of free-riders.  But I do not 
think the Court will fine-tune that on the basis of the Constitution.  It 
will leave it to the Congress to do more of the fine-tuning. 
So I think, there are good doctrinal arguments, but I am not sure 
that they are going to carry the day when the Court is faced with the 
need to protect databases, which it always seems to do, and the 
global implications of the United States not being able to get 
database protection in the E.U. 
I did not want to get into that, but you raised the question that Feist 
could be reexamined.  Yes, I think the Court might reexamine some 
of the things.  And, of course, all the constitutional statements were 
really dicta because sweat of the brow was prohibited by the 
Copyright Act. 
 
 54 17 U.S. 316, 412 (1819). 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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But I think your article is excellent.56  You should have been on 
this panel.  Rather than just lolling around in the back there, you 
should have been up here working during this session. 
Chuck, I think you wanted to say something. 
CHARLES SIMS:  Just briefly. 
Whatever that view I think might have had, for an effort by 
Congress to try to create property-like protection, I think there is 
really no chance that the Court would say that Congress could not 
use the misappropriation approach.  After all, there has been 
misappropriation law at the state level.  If Congress can preempt a 
good deal of misappropriation law, they can certainly, it seems to 
me, create a federal standard.  It is not all that different from what 
Section 43(a) does with respect to unfair competition.57 
There is a marvelous old misappropriation case involving the 
institution across the street, in which somebody went into the 
Metropolitan Opera with a tape recorder and recorded the 
performance, which was not otherwise being fixed.58  The 
Constitution and the copyright law both say there is no copyright 
 
 56 Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial 
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKLEY TECH. 
L.J. 535 (2000). 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). The statute reads as follows: 
False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden  
(a) Civil action.  
  (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for 
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which  
  (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person, or  
  (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another persons goods, services, or 
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.  
 
 58 See Metropolitan Opera Assn v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 
(1950). 
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protection for something that is not fixed.  Misappropriation law bars 
you from going into that kind of performance  or even an NBA 
performance  making your own videotape, and beaming it directly 
to the world.  And I do not think that could have been done at the 
Olympics either.  When you go into a sports event, there is writing 
on your ticket that usually says you cannot make a complete 
reproduction of this event.  But if you snuck in so that you did not 
have that contractual limitation, I think the same misappropriation 
laws still would apply, and Congress has the constitutional power 
under the Commerce Clause to address those kinds of harms. 
MR. EISENBACH:  Just a quick point.  If it were to turn out that 
Congress did not have the constitutional power to enact database 
legislation under the Commerce Clause, then it raises at least a 
question of whether Section 30159 could be amended specifically not 
to preempt state misappropriation laws and allow those laws to be 
enforceable. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  And, of course, in Feist, Justice 
OConnor did say there is state misappropriation for some remedies, 
so she was cognizant of that.  But she was just like someone on a 
roll, without an opponent.  I am not sure how much close scrutiny the 
other Justices applied, or whether she considered the implications of 
her decision for a fact situation like this. 
Lets move on to another issue, unless someone wants to discuss 
that further. 
What about the actual need for a federal statute?  I know we have 
people who say there is such need.  The reality is people seem to be 
doing all right, making a lot of money.  Maybe the litigation is more 
difficult.  But should we wait longer to see?  In other words, if you 
pass legislation too early, it might actually over-protect or under-
protect.  Are we at a stage where we really can tell?  There does not 
seem to be a tremendous amount of wholesale infringement going 
on, at least enough to maybe tell us exactly how a statute should be 
worded?  I am just throwing that out for discussion. 
 
 59 17 U.S.C. § 301.  
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Any ideas, first from anybody who has not spoken yet, and then 
we will go to the people who have spoken? 
PARTICIPANT [E. Leonard Rubin, Gordon & Glickson]:  Isnt 
the EU Directive compelling here?  Doesnt it almost require that 
there be some legislation? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  In what sense? 
PARTICIPANT [Mr. Rubin]:  As I understand the EU Directive, it 
says that no reciprocal protection will be given to databases that 
belong to countries that do not have some sort of legislation that also 
protects databases. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Yes, actually it does say that.  The 
Council has to approve protection for any country outside the E.U.  
The Recitals say something about how it has to be a comparable 
level of protection.60 
But why would that be compelling?  We could make a different 
choice.  We could say, We dont need database protection. 
PARTICIPANT [Mr. Rubin]:  We can, indeed, except when we 
trade with our European partners. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Your point is well taken.  That is the 
only reason we have a copyright term of authors life plus seventy 
years, because of the rule of the shorter term in the Term Directive of 
the European Union.  Congress never would have gone to life plus 
seventy if it had not been for the European Union and the reciprocity 
provision.  But unfortunately, whereas the copyright term affected a 
lot more people, database is more discrete.  I think you also have a 
user community that is much more active with regard to database 
protection than there was with regard to the Term Directive. 
And also, the technical industry is generally contributing to the 
Republicans.  If the House goes Democratic, the whole world is 
probably going to change on this legislation.  Right now, the 
Republicans have been getting so much money from the technical 
industries that they have been calling the tune much more than in the 
 
 60  See supra note 7. 
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past.  A lot of the debate just has to do with a much stronger user 
community getting involved in this issue, because they think their 
interests are more important.  If not for the users, the librarians and 
the scientific community would not have been enough to have 
stopped it, in my view.  As worthy as that should be, I really think 
here, to some degree, it is a very strong, powerful group of 
companies that are opposing, and that is having a dramatic effect. 
Anyone else on the need for the bill? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Alain Strowel, Nauta Dutilh, Brussels]:  
I have a comment on the European situation vis-à-vis the American 
debate on the protection of databases.  Of course there is, as you said, 
an obligation to provide similar protection in the U.S. because of the 
reciprocity rule.  Nevertheless, the present situation (with a better 
protection of databases in Europe) did not result in a massive move 
of the database industry to Europe since the implementation of the 
Directive in the various Member States.  Therefore, it is not clear 
whether there is a real economic incentive to adopt the same type of 
legislation in the U.S..  In addition, it must be stressed that the entry 
into force of the directive did not generate outcries from the user 
community or from institutions of users, such as libraries. 
So I would say that, after three years now, the debate is less 
passionate in Europe.  Some big questions remain nevertheless  
namely, on the condition of protection (substantial investment), and 
on the scope of protection (substantial taking). These controversial 
points have generated various interpretations.  For instance, in the 
Netherlands, there have been a few interesting cases in the past 
months. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  What did they do in Holland?  What 
made them interesting? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Strowel]:  Well, there have been two 
main cases.  One case in January concerned a phone directory which 
was online, out of which the defendant was taking the data.61  There 
the court said database protection and we prohibit this kind of 
 
 61  See KPN/XSO, Rb., Gravenhage, 14 Jan. 2000, AA 4712, available at http:// 
www.rechtspraac.nl (last visited Mar. 8, 2001). 
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linking or extraction. 
Another case, concerning titles of newspaper articles, was  decided 
in August, and in this case the court said no protection for a 
compilation of titles of newspapers  just the opposite of the 
former decision.62 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  A compilation of what? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Strowel]:  Of news and more 
particularly of the titles of newspaper articles, which were on a  Web 
site and used as pointers, as in the well-known Shetland case.63  It 
was some kind of aggregating Web site with titles of various 
newspapers, and you could, by clicking on them, jump directly to the 
text of the articles posted on external sites. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  And under your view, is that a correct 
decision, under an intellectually honest interpretation of the EU 
Directive, or not? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Strowel]:  The first decision just 
mentioned was correct.  Concerning the second one, the issue is 
whether there was substantial investment.  The fact that the 
newspapers were just listing on a page of their site the titles of the 
published articles (with internal links to the text of these articles) 
does not amount to substantial investment in my mind, so that, on 
this basis, an aggregating site could be allowed to reproduce the list 
of titles. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Both decisions were correct? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Strowel]:  Yes, they were okay, at least 
on the issue of database protection. 
 
 
 62  See Algmeen Dagblad / Eureka Internetdiensten, Rb., Rotterdam, 22 August 2000, 
AA 6826, available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl and for an unofficial English translation, 
see http://www.ivir.nl (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).  
 63  See Shetland Times Ltd. v. Wills, 1997 Sess. Cas. 316, 1996 WL 1093516 (Ct. Sess. 
Scot. 1997); see also Shetland Times Case Settles, 8 SCL ELECTRONIC MAGAZINE 5, 
available at http://www.scl.org/scl/emag/emagazine/vol8/iss5/vol8-iss5-shetland-times.html 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2001). 
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But if I may say one more word, I think important to stress that we 
have a real property right on databases in Europe.  So it is easier to 
draft and conclude contracts on databases.  In some countries, you 
have an additional procedural advantage: indeed, because of the 
property right nature of this sui generis right, it is possible to 
introduce a special action on the merits. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  What action? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Strowel]:  Well, an action allowing for 
a fast-track procedure that you can use for intellectual property 
rights, not in the case of actions based on unfair competition.  I do 
not want to go into the details here.  So, to have a property right as 
such could bring collateral advantages. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  So are you saying that the federal bill 
will not meet the reciprocity requirement? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Strowel]:  If it is not a property right, I 
think the reciprocity requirement of the European Directive is not 
respected. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  That is a very interesting debate.  The 
really interesting thing about this is that Europe wants us to have 
database protection because then we both can go to the WIPO and 
get a worldwide treaty on database protection.  Unless we are in 
there, Europe is not going to get a treaty. 
But if you say that whatever we do will not result in reciprocity, 
you kill the incentive for Congress to legislate protection, because 
one of the incentives for Congress to do so is to get the reciprocity. 
The reality is that while we are talking about a misappropriation 
bill, it actually is a right  a sui generis right in misappropriation 
clothing.  I have gone through it, and I cannot think of anything you 
cannot do that you would not be able to do under this than if it had 
the same type of protection under sui generis.  So those critics of it, 
saying it is really not misappropriation, I think are right.  In 
misappropriation, you just say misappropriation law applies.  But 
no, they give definitions, rights, remedies, everything else, which is 
really just what you would do with the sui generis law. 
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The reality is that if you get the same level of protection, whatever 
you call it, Europe should be content with that, because, ultimately, it 
will never get more than that.  That is why no one from the European 
Commission has said anything like what you are saying.  But you are 
an independent  a professor. 
But the Commission is very quiet, trying to make it work and not 
saying things that generally would lead Congress to think a U.S. law 
would not meet the reciprocity requirement.  But it will be interesting 
to see. 
Anyone else? 
MR. EISENBACH:  A brief comment.  I think in terms of the need 
for the protection, one, I think you need to focus back on the Internet.  
The Internet allows access and copying, through crawling and other 
mechanisms, to be done very quickly.  You can, within days, put up 
the very same entire database, or large portions extracted from it, on 
another Web site.  So, I think the speed of the Internet is one factor. 
For me, though, the other one that I think is compelling is that 
youve got a situation in which someone is going to have this data 
available on their Web site, and if that type of copying or extraction 
continues, at some point they are going to say, Weve got to make 
this a subscription or a password or some other form of protection 
that all of the users around the world now will have to do, instead of 
simply being able to visit that Web site freely whenever they want to, 
without giving their name or a password. 
So I am concerned that, without this kind of protection, the self-
help measures that owners of these databases will employ will 
actually slow down the dissemination of information. 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Stanley Rothenberg, Moses & Singer, 
LLP, Adjunct Professor Fordham University School of Law]:  One 
of the problems I have with the kind of database that was just 
described, where the second comer is taking out the headlines of 
articles or titles of articles and creating an index of these titles, is if 
you looked at it as a copyright matter, you might say that certainly 
one can take the titles of articles from a periodical and create an 
index of them.  For one thing, it seems to me to be a fair use of those 
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titles. 
And secondly, it seems to me to be a transformative use of the 
original periodical, which again reinforces the contribution that is 
being made to the public and the fair use aspect of it.  So, to permit 
the owner of the periodical to stop this by way of a database property 
right seems to be undermining the principles of the copyright law. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  I think the facts in that case were that he 
copied a database created by someone else.  The person who was 
sued did not go in and do all this work himself.  So your fact pattern 
is different  I am going in and taking all these titles and 
everything else and putting them together and someone is trying to 
stop me.  I dont think those were the facts.  It was that someone 
already did that and this person copied that database, right? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Rothenberg]:  Okay, I see.  That is all 
right. 
MR. SIMS:  As an example, take the Schwann Catalog64 of all 
records, or Books in Print.65  There is nothing original about Books in 
Print; it is the name of every book in print and information supplied 
by publishers, exactly as anybody would want.  I really think it is 
probably equivalent to the White Pages, in that it has the name of the 
book, the publisher, the price, and maybe the city where it is 
published.  It is compiled at huge expense.  Why should somebody 
be able to simply take the whole thing and start selling it?  I do not 
think that makes sense. 
I think our sense of justice would be  at least, mine would be  
offended by the notion of simply taking the whole Schwann Catalog, 
or the whole Books in Print, or the whole Readers Guide to 
Periodicals,66 which you and I probably relied on in school.  Those 
were compiled at expense.  They were sold.  Why should somebody 
 
 64  William Schwann, THE SCHWANN CATALOG. The first Schwann Catalog listed all the 
classical LPs that were then available. Today Schwann Publications publishes several 
catalogs on different musical genres. See http://www.schwann.com/inside/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2001). 
 65  BOOKS IN PRINT (1948-2001). 
 66  THE READERS GUIDE TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE.  The Readers Guide to Periodical 
Literature is an author-subject print index of general interest English-language periodicals. 
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be able to rip off the whole thing and start selling it?  It does not 
make sense. 
The notion that Congress or states are  or ought to  be hobbled 
from protecting those investments that people make does not make a 
lot of sense to me either.  Which is not to say that using it one day is 
a violation.  Obviously it is not. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Professor Benkler? 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Yochai Benkler, New York University 
School of Law]:  So, Chuck, you like H.R. 1858, the one that gives 
protection only to copying of the whole, slavish copying, and sale 
competition.  You do not like H.R. 354 that says if you take two or 
three facts and sell them with or without competition, maybe use 
them as a user, then you have a right  it is a property right.  It is 
just called misappropriation to get around Feist. 
MR. SIMS: Well, I think there is a difference between a 
misappropriation, which is I think what it sounds like to me, of most 
or all of the thing, or substantial parts, as distinct from H.R. 1858, 
which I do not like at all, partly because it sets the FTC67 astride 
without any individual remedies, and is therefore, entirely useless. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Well, no one can be for H.R. 1858.  It is 
not a serious bill for the protection of databases.  They are talking 
about a wolf in sheeps clothing.  You pass H.R. 1858, it preempts 
all state law, there will be no private action, and you have to take the 
whole database. 
And, of course, the bill went under tremendous scrutiny.  I think 
the Commerce Committee spent probably seventeen minutes on it.  If 
it would be enacted, it would dramatically reduce database 
protection.  I really cannot imagine that is actually going to happen.  
But you never know.  Certainly it will not happen in this Congress. 
PARTICIPANT [Sabrina McLaughlin, U.S. Department of 
Commerce]:  From the angle of the Department of Commerce and 
from my own personal perspective, I strongly agree with you that 
 
 67  Federal Trade Commission. 
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what makes this compelling is the Internet angle. 
From a policy perspective, it does not really matter whether there 
are more databases being produced  a numerical statistic.  What is 
more important is whether the taking of works in this way have a 
substantial effect on global leaders in electronic commerce?  Will 
this thwart the growth of electronic commerce?  Will it hobble it by, 
for example, making users sign up in these individual regimes? 
And so I think that this legislation on database is going to move 
and will move.  It is just a question of whether it will be a balance of 
H.R. 1858, whether it will be in a H.R. 1858 kind of form, or 
whether it will be a H.R. 354 kind of form.  But I do not see it 
moving without a private right of action. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  So you said it will move. 
PARTICIPANT [Ms. McLaughlin]:  In the next Congress. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  It is nice that Ms. McLaughlin is here 
from the Commerce Department.  I have trouble figuring out what its 
position is.  It seems to be just sitting on the sidelines and saying a 
few things.  What is the position of the Commerce Department? 
PARTICIPANT [Ms. McLaughlin]:  Well, the position has been 
 actually, our former General Counsel is very strongly involved in 
the negotiations and in the discussions at the committee level  that 
H.R. 354 was the better bill.  It was not perfect, but it was by far the 
better bill. 
And, that we could not sit around waiting for it, relying on a 
Second Circuit case alone, and we need to think about what checks 
and balances were in order.  We gave a lot of thought to that, because 
the Department of Commerce, for example, does encompass NOAA, 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the kind 
of scientists that generally say, How can you lock up facts in a very 
simplistic way? 
In fact, there have been later iterations of the bill that define 
potential and actual markets with a lot of particularity, and I think 
strengthen the bill. 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN:  So you see some bill being enacted in 
the next Congress? 
PARTICIPANT:  [Ms. McLaughlin]: Right. 
PARTICIPANT:  I want to address self-help for a minute, but 
before I do, suffice it to say that we obviously believe that we see a 
fair amount of wholesale copying, call it what you want to call it   
call it free-riding, call it aggregating. 
There are two notes on self-help.  But, first I will second Mr. 
Eisenbachs point, that ultimately we believe it is bad for the 
consumer.  We believe the measures that we undertake disfavor the 
consumer. 
More importantly, as some of the panelists pointed out, the 
measures are available.  What they are really saying in economic 
terms is spend lots of money protecting the databases  which is 
fine for the big public company.  I would point out that it does not 
really help the database creator that is not a big public company, that 
does not have those funds available.  We may not be in that situation, 
but many are. 
More importantly, framing the argument of self-help as one that 
puts the onus on the database creator is somewhat disingenuous.  The 
same remedies that are available to the database creator  you have 
been calling it self-help  are available to the person who would 
like to be in that database business and is copying  for example, 
the advertising remedy, the contractual remedy, and the marketing 
remedy.  To frame it by saying that the original database creator 
ought to undertake self-help is to deny that all those remedies are 
also available. 
Any one of the parties mentioned in any of these lawsuits has the 
ability to create the same databases.  There is no other barrier to 
entry than the financial one.  Jurisline merely needed to spend money 
to aggregate on its own the cases it took from Lexis.  Bidders Edge 
only needed to spend money to create the types of auctions that eBay 
so successfully created.  This measure is available to the people that 
want it, to anyone who wants to undertake these types of databases. 
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MR. COTTER:  On the issue of aggregators and free-riders, we are 
back to the same, with all due respect, unhelpful name-calling, 
frankly. 
You have to look at what exactly is the prospective defendant 
doing, the alleged copier.  Are they in fact wholesale copying and 
going into direct competition with the database builder who spent all 
this money, whether they be a large public company or a start-up?  
Has the alleged free-rider taken that information and used it in a way 
that competes directly against the source of the data?  Have they 
effectively taken everything the database originator  if that is the 
right word, although it may not be original  has started with and 
gone into direct competition?  I think those are important questions.  
You have to look at how is the information obtained. 
We have also heard some comments before, again, with all due 
respect, about crawling.  Understanding the significance of crawling 
is, it is an important thing here, if we are going to use crawling as an 
example of a free-riding activity.  You have to look at how the 
information is obtained, and then you have to look at what is done 
with it in a commercial sense.  Is it a case that a Lycos68 is crawling 
and then competing in a direct fashion with everyone it acquires 
information from?  I do not think so.  I do not believe Bidders Edge 
is doing that either.  And there are lots of other companies that may 
or may not be doing it. 
But I think you really have to look at that question before you can 
reach the conclusion that it is free-riding and it is bad for start-ups or 
large public companies, whomever. 
 
 
 68 In October 2000, Terra Networks, S.A., a global Internet company and the leading 
provider of Internet access and interactive content and services to the Spanish and 
Portuguese speaking world and Lycos, Inc., the Internet's leading multi-brand network 
combined to form Terra Lycos.  The new Terra Lycos is one of the most popular Internet 
networks in the U.S., Canada, Europe and Asia and is the leading portal to Spanish and 
Portuguese-speaking markets.  Terra Lycos provides users a compelling network of Web 
brands and gives advertisers access to a vast and diverse audience.  Terra Lycos has the 
largest global footprint of any Internet portal with more than 140 sites in 41 countries 
through its network of websites as well as through joint venture partnerships. Terra Lycos 
Overview at http://www.terralycos.com/about/au_1_2_1.html (Mar. 8, 2001). 
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PROFESSOR HANSEN:  I think that is a very good point, and I 
think that is what our courts do.  People are focusing on this bill in 
Congress, for instance, H.R. 354, and saying it is too draconian. 
Fair use was created by the courts out of whole cloth.  The courts 
are constantly doing this sort of balancing.  For instance, if there was 
not a fair use provision in H.R. 354, the courts would have created 
one.  They created it for the Copyright Act.69 
And if courts do not create such a provision, they will protect a fair 
use in another way.  In the case where courts think the alleged 
misappropriation is okay, they could find no substantial investment 
or an insubstantial taking.  And certainly, a jury  the pure policy 
animal   will do it, without having to craft a reason. 
So ultimately, we may be talking about a lot of cases in which, in 
the long run, the court is going to say who is the good guy and who 
is the bad guy?  Does the public suffer or not?  They will figure this 
all out, and then come up with a doctrine which explains the result, 
although maybe not in a great way. 
So, I think ultimately when this comes to litigation judges are 
applying policy.  In INS v. AP70 there was no established doctrine to 
reach the result.  They created the misappropriation doctrine to reach 
the policy result unreachable under copyright law.  The Court simply 
thought the conduct was wrong and created doctrine.  On the other 
hand, when there was too much protection, they created the fair use 
doctrine.  Our courts are not hesitant about doing this balancing.  
Ultimately, I think, at least in the federal courts, you are going to get 
some sort of balancing. 
PARTICIPANT [Professor Benkler]: Chuck Sims was very 
successful in persuading Judge Kaplan recently that now that there is 
a statutory fair use, if Congress does not specifically enact it, it can 
no longer be imputed by common law vis-à-vis the DMCA.71  So 
there is a concern with this notion of statutory foreclosure, once 
 
 69  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended 
throughout 17 U.S.C.). 
 70 See Intl News Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 71 See Universal City Studios v. Remerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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Congress knows about something and does not include it.  That 
would create a problem specifically for that line of doctrinal 
argument. 
More specifically, on the point of the need and the cost, we have 
heard the argument about the need for incentives.  We have heard the 
argument about the need to avoid forcing database owners to erect 
self-help measures. 
I think it is worthwhile to use the eBay v. Bidders Edge context to 
understand the core problem.72  The core competing concern, is not 
necessarily consumer access.  It is downstream producer access.  The 
economic function of something like Bidders Edge is to take 
existing information and re-present it. 
And, there is the argument that property rights has been a 
workable concept in the old economy, but that we need stronger 
property rights in the new economy.  That is false.  The standard 
economic understanding of real property, or physical materials, is 
fundamentally different from the standard economic understanding 
of information.  Information is a public good.  Once it is produced, 
the cost of using it is zero; the social cost of using it is zero. 
If we lived in an ideal world where all information producers could 
get paid by some mechanism other than property rights, we should 
abolish all property rights.  We do not live in that ideal world.  But 
we have to understand the ideal from a purely economic perspective 
 not in any political ideology, but purely from an economic 
perspective  is we would get the most information production if 
we had no property rights and some other mechanism, like 
advertising, that could pay suppliers without them having to force 
users. 
So we come back to what is the effect of a database right in eBay 
and Bidders Edge.  The effect is that eBay moved first, everybody 
knows them, people put their stuff on there, people know that that is 
where most of the stuff is, they will go and search there.  Other 
people who want to put their stuff on say, Well, people go to 
 
 72 eBay, Inc. v. Bidders Edge, Inc. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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Bidders Edge and search there, so I will put my things there.  Other 
people who want to search say, Well, more people are putting 
things on eBay, I will go and search there. 
What a downstream user of a database, like an auction aggregator, 
does, is take information from an existing database, and produce new 
information by using the existing information at its real social cost, 
which is zero.  Whenever you introduce a cost to information, that 
means people like Bidders Edge will use existing information too 
little.  That is the standard economic understanding.  What you will 
end up having is one eBay, or maybe two, with whatever services 
they provide to control the data. 
The alternative is that you get the data itself being pushed to its 
marginal cost of zero and the competition being on better service  
better insurance, better credit insurance for the payors, better 
connections, faster searches within the auction, all sorts of things that 
consumers value  rather than a monopoly around this particular 
contingent circumstance that you happened to be first on the market 
and, therefore, have more information about what people want to 
sell. 
PARTICIPANT [Ms. McLaughlin]:  But, what your argument 
seems to neglect to address is transformative use.  The idea is people 
want to be able to know what is there.  They need to be able to use 
the information that they are collecting and do something with it that 
makes it of value to the public.  That is not simply having more 
information being taken in one place and more people knowing about 
it because other people are taking it and sharing it. 
PARTICIPANT:  In furtherance of Mr. Cotters point, particularly 
in response to Mr. Simss message, that you have to look at who is 
the free-rider, I do not think that Merrill Lynch will free ride  they 
are always going to have their Bloomberg.  Proskauer attorneys are 
not going to use Jurisline; they are going to use Lexis and Westlaw.  
So, when you say that there is this Standard & Poors service that 
people pay for and they will not pay for it anymore.  I do not think 
that Goldman Sachs will ever go searching for free information on 
the Internet.  The big information providers will not lose their 
customers by the so-called free-riding. 
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MR. SIMS:  Why do you assume it is going to be free?  The more 
worrisome prospect is that somebody is going to take the whole thing 
and themselves start to resell it.  That is what happened in the 
Jurisline case.  I mean, Merrill Lynch could take the whole Standard 
& Poors historical database, incredibly valuable information about 
every stock released since the 1920s,  and just take it wholesale and 
start moving into that business. 
PARTICIPANT:  Isnt Jurisline free? 
MR. SIMS:  They were selling eyeballs to advertisers.  The notion 
that law firms that have million-dollar bills annually for valuable 
databases will to continue pay millions of dollars when they can get 
stuff for free is unreasonable  you know, you should talk to our 
cost people. 
PARTICIPANT:  Really, I think the clients are paying for this, not 
Proskauer. 
MR. GIBBONS:  Clients like to pay less. 
PARTICIPANT:  I am Katherine Forrest with Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore.  I am on a later panel. 
I want to follow up on the comment directed to Mr. Cotter: What 
is the economic model that you are suggesting is for the user of the 
database?  You are saying that you look at who the end-user is and 
that this, in turn, informs you as to the legality of the use.  Is the 
economic model similar to what Mr. Sims just described, which is 
the sale of eyeballs, an advertising model, and not a direct revenue 
producing situation between the consumer and potentially your 
client, but something where your client is getting paid by 
advertising?  Or, is the economic model different? 
Then I would just put a question at the end, which is: if the 
economic model is an advertising-based model, and I know you do 
not like the word, why isnt it free-riding? 
MR. COTTER:  I think you are getting almost to deep linking in 
that sense, if you are going to talk about eyeball time and advertising.  
The model varies.  It depends on who is doing the aggregating and 
for what purpose.  I mean, it is  just restating your question  
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whether it is a library-type function or a commercial-type function 
where they are going to sell advertising space.  So, that is a 
possibility. 
Now, why isnt it free-riding?  It is not free-riding because it is not 
wholesale copying. 
PARTICIPANT [Ms. Forrest]:  Can I ask one follow-up question?  
Is the hypothetical client in this situation getting paid by anybody for 
the formation of their business, and business being the entity which 
uses the information from the database?  Are they receiving an 
economic return? 
MR. COTTER:  They may be, they may be. 
PARTICIPANT: [Christopher Pennisi, Symposium Editor, 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law 
Journal]:  I would like to address the panelists who do not presently 
represent a database client.  Why would you feel uncomfortable 
without legislative protection of databases?  There have been cases 
decided in database owners favor which turned entirely on existing 
principles of law.  I am assuming you could always license out your 
information by just putting in a user agreement and password 
protection.  Why do we need the two bills, or any bill? 
MS. FERRI:  I think that what some of the cases have shown is 
that a person compiling data cannot count on protection stemming 
from contract or trespass theory, because obviously if you are in a 
court that is accepting a preemption theory, it will not work for you.  
I think that the idea of having some legislation is an idea that is not 
going to go away. 
However, I think, from what we are seeing here today, the 
legislation as it is drafted and proposed now is just not going to 
work.  It does not take into consideration the idea of innovative uses 
of data. 
I think that some of those concepts were brought out very well in 
the amicus brief filed in the eBay v. Bidders Edge73 case, which 
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discussed the need for shopping bots74 and price comparison, and 
that there is an innovative use there that is of benefit to the other 
users of the Internet. 
MR. GIBBONS:  I think we have to keep in mind as we are 
negotiating this landscape as to what is the proper calculus between 
the database compilers return on investment, so to speak, and the 
cost to end-users or competitive users, what have you, to access what 
has traditionally been held by the Court to be publicly available 
information  i.e., facts or unoriginal ideas. 
How much of a lock-up do we want in order to so-called properly 
compensate the compiler, and what will the real-world impact be on 
the availability of information?  We have to keep that in mind. 
That is why I think there is a stall, frankly, on the Coble Bill, 
because of a concern that the Bill is overly broad.  In fact, on an 
earlier version of the Bill, the Department of Justice commented that 
they thought it had the potential of being overruled by the Supreme 
Court as unconstitutional in light of Feist and an impermissible use 
of the Commerce Clause. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  That was written by an academic from 
Fordham, and you just cannot trust these academics. 
Let me ask you, Rob, what do you think the chances of some bill 
passing in the next Congress? 
MR. GIBBONS:  I am not sure, but I think there is going to have 
to be some more of a blending between the Bliley Bill (H.R. 1858), 
which is far narrower, and the Coble Bill (H.R. 354), which is very 
broad in prohibiting the taking of a substantial portion of a database.  
What does substantial portion really mean?  Who defines that? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  I do not want you to argue the case.  
Just what are the chances, do you think, of it happening, however it 
turns out? 
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MR. GIBBONS:  I think that the pressure is there for Congress to 
do something.  I feel that there will be a narrower bill passed, a 
streamlining of the Coble Bill, and then, at some point in the not-too-
distant future, it will come up as a constitutional challenge in the 
courts. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  Okay. 
MR. EISENBACH:  Just one quick comment to the professors 
comment and to Mr. Cotter.  The information may on some 
theoretical level be a public good, but it sure was created by private 
investment.  To allow it to go downstream to anybody without 
paying anything for it because on a theoretical level there should be 
no cost  would be untenable.  There is a cost, and that is, that if it 
is perpetuated by many, many different people doing the same thing, 
eventually the parties that are compiling the information in the first 
instance are going to stop, because many Internet companies rely on 
advertising and other sources of income in order to continue the 
compiling process. 
I think we need to balance that, and I think the result is not to 
allow free-riding.  If someone wants to use the information for 
aggregation or some other basis, let them pay a license and do so 
under reasonable license terms. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN:  For reasons of time, that will have to be 
the last word.  Let me just say thank you very much to the panelists 
and to the audience for a very good session. 
MR. PENNISI:  I would also like to thank the panelists and the 
audience members for an interesting debate. 
